Camp Mystic had no emergency plan for July 4 flood, report finds

• A Texas legislative investigation found Camp Mystic failed to adequately plan for or respond to a deadly 2025 flood.
• The report states the camp lacked proper written emergency plans and did not evacuate in a timely manner.
• Twenty-five young girls, two counselors, and the camp's co-executive director were killed in the flood.
• The investigation also found that post-incident management and communication with families were chaotic.

A Texas legislative investigation found that Camp Mystic failed to plan, prepare and adequately respond to the July 4, 2025, flood that killed 28 people at the girls' summer camp.

The report, released Thursday, June 18, comes nearly a year after the deadly flooding at the summer camp, detailing the event's timeline that led to 25 young girls, two camp counselors and the camp's co-executive director being killed.

The investigation also concluded the following:

• The camp did not have written emergency plans that complied with state requirements.
• The camp did not adequately prepare for the July 3-4, 2025, storm.
• The camp did not timely evacuate in advance of the July 3-4, 2025, storm, despite ample opportunity to do so.

Finally, the investigation found that the camp's re-unification efforts and incident management were chaotic, withtraumatic effects for families.

Here is a look at the report on the Texas House and Senate joint investigation findings into the Camp Mystic flooding.

Texas' timeline of deadly Camp Mystic flood

The event started on Sunday, June 29, 2025, when Camp Mystic in Kerr County — 80 miles northwest of San Antonio — welcomed 557 campers — 386 to the Guadalupe River camp and 171 to the Cypress Lake camp.

On Wednesday, July 2, 2025, the Texas Department of State Health Services conducted its annual inspection of the camp. As the report stated, the DSHS inspector had incorrectly affirmed Camp Mystic’s compliance with emergency procedures because it did not address epidemics, fatalities or what to do in the event of a flood evacuation.

It was also on July 2 that weather forecasts began to suggest heavy rain in the Texas Hill Country over the next few days, prompting the Texas Division of Emergency Management to activate state emergency response resources in anticipation of increased flood threats in the area.

At 1:18 p.m. on Thursday, July 3, 2025, the National Weather Service issued a flood watch for the area, with activities at Camp Mystic continuing as normal.

The investigation reported that no staff members or directors were aware of the watch throughout the day.

"As the directors and staff of Camp Mystic went to bed on July 3, the flood watch was still in effect, but nobody was aware of it, and nobody was exercising additional vigilance, with the likely exception of Dick (Eastland)," the report read.

The investigation also found no outreach from Kerr County or its local government partners to alert the camp to the flood watch or to any expectations of severe weather, with Kerr County Emergency Management Coordinator William Thomas scheduled off on July 3 and Kerr County Judge Rob Kelly out of the county.

Rain started to fall, with the camp’s co-executive director, Dick Eastland, receiving an alert on his phone at 1:06 a.m. on July 4, 2025, from the AcuRite app that one-tenth of an inch of rain had fallen.

At 1:14 a.m., the National Weather Service issued a flash flood warning for the area, including Camp Mystic.

Here is a brief overview of the event that the investigation revealed on the early morning of July 4:

• 1:45 a.m.: Dick Eastland radios son Edward and the grounds crew to move equipment.
• 2:11 a.m.: Night watchman reports flooding to retired fire chief.
• 2:14 a.m.: Edmunson/Bubble Gum Creek becomes impassable.
• 2:30 a.m.: Bug House and Look Inn counselors run to the office to report water in the cabins.
• 2:33 a.m.: Dick texts his wife, Tweety, reporting over four inches of rain had already fallen.
• 2:37 a.m.: Dick and Edward drive Bug House / Look Inn counselors back to the cabins.
• 2:55 a.m.: Gate guard radios for help and reports flooding inside the guard house.
• 3 a.m.: Dick radios, "We need to start getting the girls out of Bug House" and Look Inn.
• 3:11 a.m. - 3:19 a.m.: Bug House, Look Inn and Hang Out evacuated to Rec Hall by vehicle.
  • This was known as evacuation attempt one, during which 50 campers and counselors were evacuated to safety, with no more than an inch of water on the road.
• 3:20 a.m. - 3:30 a.m.: Tumble Inn I and II evacuated by vehicle, with Jumble House directed to walk to the Rec Hall.
  • This was evacuation attempt two, with water rising to ankle-deep. All campers had departed from the cabins, but an unaccompanied Jumble House camper, 10-year-old Greta Toranzo, was last seen returning to the cabin to retrieve an item. She reportedly died in the floodwaters.
  • Seven cabins still needed to be evacuated.
• 3:30 a.m. - 3:40 a.m.: Water level was knee deep.
  • Nut Hut and Chatterbox self-evacuate uphill as Dick drives to Bubble Inn.
  • Edward assists at Twins I and II, with the night watchman assisting at Giggle Box and Wiggle Inn.
  • Dick radios for help with Bubble Inn.
    • "I have Bubble Inn cabin in my car. I’m stuck against a tree. I need help," Dick radioed in at this time.
• 3:51 a.m.: Dick is submerged.
  • 13 campers and two camp counselors from Bubble Inn died during the rescue attempt, along with Dick.
• 4:09 a.m.: Edward is submerged and swept to the Bug House tree with campers and counselors.
  • 11 campers from Twin I and II died in the flood.
  • Despite ongoing efforts, as of June 18, 2026, rescuers still have not found Cile Steward.
• 4:19 a.m.: 911 call reports rescue of two Twins campers downriver.
• 5 a.m. - 7 a.m.: Other adults help survivors descend from trees and roofs.

Camp Mystic investigation finds gaps in state compliance, stall in evacuation orders

The report concluded several points after its investigation that are broken down into the following four categories: 

Camp Mystic did not have written emergency plans that complied with state requirements

• The camp did not have written emergency plans specifying how each occupied building would be evacuated in the event of a flood.
• The camp’s written emergency plan instructed campers to shelter in place and to await further instruction.
• Procedures for the actual evacuation of cabins in the event of a flood were not reviewed with camp staff and counselors, who did not receive specific assignments of responsibility.
• Campers were not instructed about how a flood evacuation would occur.
• To the extent Camp Mystic had an evacuation plan for its Guadalupe Camp cabins based on past flood experiences, that plan was not documented in writing and was not communicated to staff, counselors, or campers.
• If there was any threshold of flooding at which sheltering in place would be abandoned and campers would be instructed how and where to evacuate to higher ground, that plan would have been known only to the camp’s co-executive director, Dick Eastland.

Camp Mystic did not adequately prepare for July 3-4, 2025 storm

• Camp Mystic staff had access to weather updates available to the general public. The National Weather Service (NWS) issued a series of weather alerts of increasing severity on July 3 and into the morning of July 4.
• In the early afternoon of July 3, a flood watch was in effect through the morning of July 4, specifically including Kerr County, and warned of the possibility of “[l]ocally heavy rainfall” that “could cause flash flooding.” Thus, the general public, including Camp Mystic, which had assumed responsibility for the safety of 557 girls, was on notice on the evening of July 3 of the risk of overnight flash flooding in the area.
• Many of Camp Mystic’s senior leaders went to bed on July 3 unaware of the potential for extreme weather. Only Dick Eastland and a security guard stayed awake at Camp Mystic to monitor the weather.
• At 1:14 a.m. on July 4, the NWS significantly upgraded its alert to a flash flood warning, through 4:15 a.m. The potential impact was identified to include “[l]ife threatening flash flooding of creeks and streams,” and Hunt was specifically identified as a location “that will experience flash flooding.” The 1:14 a.m. warning also stated: “Most flood deaths occur in vehicles.”
• As flooding events unfolded, adult camp staff in their residences became aware of rising water and the severity of the storm, and some eventually evacuated themselves to higher ground, but they had been assigned no responsibility to assist with evacuating the Guadalupe River Camp cabins, and they generally were "unaware of the horrors experienced by the campers."

Camp Mystic did not timely evacuate in advance of July 3-4, 2025, storm, despite ample opportunity to do so

• Instead of using a public address system or going cabin to cabin to instruct campers and order an immediate evacuation, Dick instructed the two other men to help evacuate the three cabins closest to the river by driving them out in vehicles. At no time during the flood was the public address system used.
• The same three adult staff then returned with their vehicles to evacuate the next cabins in sequence. By then, the water on the road covered their ankles, and all campers still had the opportunity to evacuate on foot.
• Dozens of other adult staff members in close proximity to the Guadalupe Camp cabins were never tasked with assisting with the evacuation of the cabins.
• Some self-evacuating counselors separated from their campers, who were directed to Rec Hall; as a result, some campers were left without adequate supervision for the remainder of the flood event.
• Counselors and campers sheltered in place in the Bubble Inn, Twins I, Twins II and Wiggle Inn cabins, as they were told, awaiting further instruction.
  • In all likelihood, Dick loaded all campers and both counselors from Bubble Inn into his vehicle. It was swept into the Guadalupe River, and all 13 campers and both counselors died.
  • Edward Eastland helped campers in the connected cabins, Twins I and Twins II, until the water rose too high for them to remain there. One camper perished in her cabin. The others all were swept away in the flood. Some, including Edward, survived, but 11 Twins campers did not survive.
  • Among the many inadequately supervised campers who had evacuated to Rec Hall, one decided to return to her cabin to retrieve an item. That camper was also lost in the flood.
• Camp leadership did not attempt to call 911 during the flood or immediately afterward.

Re-unification efforts and incident management were chaotic, with traumatic effects for families

• Parents of campers were unnecessarily traumatized by the delivery of incomplete and conflicting information while they waited to learn whether their loved ones had survived.
• In addition to concerns about Camp Mystic’s emergency planning and response, parents were frustrated by the lack of meaningful communication and effective coordination in the flood’s aftermath.

Mateo Rosiles is the Texas Connect reporter for USA TODAY and its regional papers in Texas. Got a news tip for him? Email him at [email protected].